There are several threats that a researcher working on organised crime could face. Some of those threats may come from the subject being researched, being a criminal group being investigated or even from an informant one may be planning to meet or interview. In some cases, the context or country where the research is being conducted, itself presents a set of threats.
Given the diversity and complexity of the threats that researchers might face in these different scenarios, it is difficult to come up with a short and exhaustive prescriptive protocol. However, there are some basic principles that apply to a wide range of situations and which should be considered as staple for anyone conducting fieldwork in a risky environment.
- Make a threat assessment: Hostile environments may require that a threat assessment be drawn up by professionals with a security background and knowledge of the context where the research will be carried out. If this is not necessary or possible, it is good practice to reflect on the likely threats inherent in your field of research and to draw up your own basic mitigation plan. The idea is to make a list of risks that relate to the physical environment you operate in, the people you will be conducting research with, and threats coming from your cyber environment, and to think of ways to mitigate these potential threats.
For instance, if you are planning a meeting with an informant that could be hostile, take care to mitigate this potential risk by setting the meeting in a busy public place. Inform a trusted colleague about the meeting and agree on a communication protocol. Think about scenarios where something goes wrong and you need to abandon the meeting abruptly.
Familiarise yourself with the surroundings of the place where the meeting will be held and make sure you have a handy transportation plan (location of public transport terminals, handy taxi company number, access to a vehicle etc).
Your threat assessment will never substitute a plan drawn up by professionals but at the very least this exercise will help you become aware of the potential threats you face and it will put you in the right frame of mind to think of ways in which to react to situations that do not go as planned.
Lastly, as a researcher on organised crime, you are likely to have among your contacts, security specialists whom you trust. Discuss your assessments with them, and perhaps with other researchers who have undertaken similar fieldwork. The broader the expertise and range of experience you rope in, the better.
Always have a tether: Whether or not the research is being carried out in a hostile environment, it is good practice to let at least one trusted designated person know about your movements. The level of detail and frequency of the information relayed depends on the environment where the research is being carried out and the level of risk the fieldwork is assessed to carry.
There will be confidentiality constraints on the sort of information that can be relayed. However, in scenarios where there is a risk of abduction, your designated tether should have as much information as possible and should be informed of any changes of plan. He or she will need to have in place a protocol of who to call and in which sequence should something go wrong.
Being able to communicate is vital therefore researchers should make sure they have adequate communications equipment (such as satellite phones when necessary) and redundancy. In scenarios that entail an abduction rusk, it is advisable to carry a tracking device that feeds information on your movements onto a platform accessible to the tether. There are commercial off-the-shelf systems such as the Garmin InReach system that perform this function and allow you to communicate via satellite simultaneously.
Keep a low profile: Always try and make yourself as inconspicuous as possible. Unless otherwise dictated by the security landscape of a particular place, always choose low-key accommodation over fancy options. The same applies for the choice of grooming, clothing, transportation etc. The rule of thumb should be to blend into your environment as much as possible.
Keep information on your whereabouts under wraps: Disclosing your whereabouts and other information concerning an investigation or research you are conducting to people who do not need to know, or worse, broadcasting it on social media, can expose you to unnecessary abduction and surveillance risk. As much as possible, do not to fix meetings with a lot of lead time or change the time and venue at the last minute.
If you need to use a fixer, translator or driver, try to only hire people who have been referred to you by someone you trust. Try to learn as much as you can about the people you work with and who would have information about your whereabouts during fieldwork. This information, including contact details, copies of identification documents and suchlike should be passed on to your designated tether.
Keep your electronic devices clean: Cyber and electronic security is a vast area in its own right. In cases where there is a credible threat of being the target of security services or criminal organisations with significant resources, the best option is to seek professional advice and/or police protection. At a more basic level, there are precautionary measures that should become basic practice for all researchers whose electronic devices could be targeted for surveillance or extraction of information.
Always work under the assumption that electronic communication is never entirely safe. Be extra careful to use strong passwords and avoid using the same password for multiple applications. Always keep your devices as clean as possible. Do store on your computer, tablet, or phone material that does not need to be stored there. Instead, constantly backup any sensitive material on physical external hard drives and/or encrypted cloud storage systems. During sensitive fieldwork, particularly in hostile environments, make sure to delete from your electronic devices any sensitive and/or compromising data including contacts, emails, internet searches, photos etc.
A better alternative is to invest in devices to be used only during fieldwork. The role of journalists and applied researchers is often viewed with suspicion in conflict zones and/or states that have an overbearing security apparatus. Besides avoiding the risk of a data theft, keeping a clean phone and/or laptop can make the difference between being waived through or spending a few hours or worse at a security checkpoint.